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Abstract
Recently, there has been a number of papers relating mechanism design and privacy (e.g.,
see [MT07, Xia11, CCK+11, NST12, NOS12, HK12]). All of these papers consider a worst-case
setting where there is no probabilistic information about the players’ types. In this paper, we
investigate mechanism design and privacy in the Bayesian setting, where the players’ types
are drawn from some common distribution. We adapt the notion of differential privacy to the
Bayesian mechanism design setting, obtaining Bayesian differential privacy. We also define a
robust notion of approximate truthfulness for Bayesian mechanisms, which we call persistent ap-
proximate truthfulness. We give several classes of mechanisms (e.g., social welfare mechanisms
and histogram mechanisms) that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy and persistent ap-
proximate truthfulness. These classes of mechanisms can achieve optimal (economic) efficiency,
and do not use any payments. We also demonstrate that by considering the above mechanisms
in a modified mechanism design model, the above mechanisms can achieve actual truthfulness.
1 Introduction
One of the main goals in mechanism design is to design mechanisms that achieve a socially desirable
outcome even if the players behave selfishly. Because of the revelation principle, mechanism design
has focused on direct (revelation) mechanisms where each player simply reports his/her private
type (or valuation). This leads to the issue of privacy, where the players may be concerned that
the mechanism’s output may leak information about their private types (even if the mechanism is
trusted).
Mechanism Design and Privacy. Traditional mechanism design did not include the aspect of
privacy. However, in the context of releasing information from databases, the issue of privacy has
already been studied quite extensively. In this context, the current standard notion of privacy is
differential privacy [DMNS06, Dwo06]. A data release algorithm satisfies differential privacy if the
algorithm’s output distribution does not change much when one person’s data is changed in the
database. This implies that the algorithm does not leak much information about any person in the
database.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the 8th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics (WINE
2012). This work was supported in part by NSF grants IIS-0534064, IIS-0812045, IIS-0911036, CCF-0746990; AFOSR
grants FA9550-08-1-0438, FA9550-09-1-0266, FA9550-10-1-0093; ARO grant W911NF-09-1-0281. We thank Joseph
Y. Halpern for helpful discussions.
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Recently, there has been a number of papers that combine mechanism design with differential
privacy. In [MT07], McSherry and Talwar develop a general mechanism called the exponential
mechanism that is differentially private; they also show that any differentially private mechanism
is approximately truthful. In [NST12], Nissim, Smorodinsky, and Tennenholtz modify the standard
mechanism design model by adding a “reaction stage”; in this new model, the authors combine
differentially private mechanisms with a “punishing mechanism” to obtain mechanisms that are
actually truthful. However, the mechanisms in [NST12] might not protect the privacy of the
players, due to the reaction stage.
The main goal of the above two papers was to use differential privacy as a tool for achieving
some form of truthfulness, as opposed to achieving privacy for the players. However, there has
been other papers that focus on designing mechanisms that protect the privacy of the players. In
[HK12], Huang and Kannan show that a pricing scheme can be added to the exponential mechanism
to make it actually truthful, resulting in a general mechanism that is both differentially private and
truthful. In [Xia11], Xiao provides a transformation that takes truthful mechanisms and transforms
them into truthful and differentially private mechanisms. On the other hand, Xiao also shows that
a mechanism that is truthful and differentially private might not be truthful in a model where the
players are “privacy-aware”, i.e., privacy is explicitly captured in the players’ utility functions. In
[CCK+11], Chen et al. construct mechanisms that are truthful even in a model where the players
are privacy-aware. In [NOS12], Nissim, Orlandi, and Smorodinsky construct mechanisms that are
truthful in a different privacy-aware model.
Bayesian Mechanism Design. One desirable property of a mechanism is (economic) efficiency ;
in fact, it would be best if the mechanism always chooses a social alternative that is optimal with
respect to some measure of efficiency, such as social welfare. However, such optimal efficiency is not
achieved by any of the above results. In fact, it is not possible for a differentially private mechanism
to achieve optimal efficiency (for a non-trivial problem), since the mechanism has to be randomized
in order to satisfy differential privacy. However, all of the above results are in a worst-case setting
where there is no probabilistic information about the players’ types. If we consider a non-worst-case
setting, then it may be possible for a mechanism to achieve differential privacy without using any
randomization.
One such setting is the Bayesian setting, where the players’ types are drawn from some dis-
tribution. Such a setting follows the Bayesian approach that has been the standard in economic
theory for many decades. Recently, mechanism design in the Bayesian setting has also been gain-
ing popularity in the computer science community. Thus, it is interesting to consider the issue of
privacy in the Bayesian setting as well. In particular, it may be possible for a Bayesian mechanism
to achieve optimal efficiency while satisfying some form of differential privacy. Achieving optimal
efficiency may be critical for certain problems, such as presidential elections and kidney transplant
allocations, where it may be unethical and/or unfair to make a non-optimal choice. Although dif-
ferentially private mechanisms in the worst-case setting may asymptotically achieve nearly optimal
efficiency in expectation (or with reasonably high probability), there is no guarantee that the chosen
outcome for a particular execution of the mechanism is actually close to optimal.
Bayesian Differential Privacy and Persistent Approximate Truthfulness. In this paper,
we consider mechanism design in the Bayesian setting, and our main goal is to construct useful
mechanisms that achieve optimal efficiency, some form of differential privacy, and some notion of
truthfulness. Since differential privacy is a worst-case notion in the sense that no distributional
assumptions are made on the input of the mechanism, we first adapt the notion of differential
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privacy to the Bayesian mechanism design setting. We call this new notion Bayesian differential
privacy ; this is the privacy notion that we use in this paper.
As mentioned above, Xiao [Xia11] showed that a mechanism that is truthful and differentially
private might not be truthful in a model where privacy is explicitly captured in the players’ utility
functions. In this paper, we do not use such a model, since there are many settings where the players
would already be satisfied with differential privacy and would not report strategically in an attempt
to further protect their privacy. Our results will be meaningful in these settings; furthermore,
even in a setting where we want to explicitly capture privacy in the players’ utility functions, our
techniques and results can still be useful in constructing truthful mechanisms (similar to how the
mechanisms in [CCK+11] and [NOS12] are still based on differentially private mechanisms).
We also want our mechanisms to satisfy some form of truthfulness. The standard notion of
truthfulness in Bayesian mechanism design is that the truthful strategy profile is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. Similar to [MT07], we first relax truthfulness so that the truthful strategy profile only
needs to be an ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium, where an ǫ margin is allowed in the Nash conditions.
However, we would like to obtain notions of truthfulness that are stronger than that provided by
the ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Thus, we strengthen the ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium such that even
if up to k players deviate from the equilibrium, everyone else’s best-response is still to adhere to
their part of the equilibrium. We call this new equilibrium concept the k-tolerant ǫ-Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. We would also like our equilibrium concept to be resilient against coalitions. Thus, we
further strengthen our notion of k-tolerant ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium to (k, r)-persistent ǫ-Bayes-
Nash equilibrium, which is resilient against coalitions of size r even in the presence of k deviating
players. The notion of truthfulness we use requires that the truthful strategy profile is a (k, r)-
persistent ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium, which we will refer to as persistent approximate truthfulness.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we present three classes of mechanisms that achieve both Bayesian differential privacy
and persistent approximate truthfulness:
Histogram Mechanisms. Roughly speaking, a histogram mechanism is a mechanism that first
computes a histogram from the reported types, and then chooses a social alternative based only
on the histogram. In Section 4.1, we show that if every bin of the histogram has positive ex-
pected count, then the histogram mechanism is both Bayesian differentially private and persistent
approximately truthful.
Mechanisms for Two Social Alternatives. Roughly speaking, this class includes any mech-
anism that makes a choice between two social alternatives {A,B} based on the difference between
the sums of two functions u(·, A) and u(·, B) on the types. In Section 4.2, we show that as long
as the random variable u(t, A)− u(t, B) (where t is distributed according to the type distribution)
has non-zero variance and a pdf, then such a mechanism is both Bayesian differentially private and
persistent approximately truthful.
Social Welfare Mechanisms. Roughly speaking, this class includes any mechanism that makes
a choice based on the social welfare provided by each social alternative. An important subset
of these mechanisms is the set of mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In Section 4.3, we
show that if the players’ valuations for each social alternative are normally distributed, then such
a mechanism is both Bayesian differentially private and persistent approximately truthful. Also,
we generalize this result to the case where the players’ valuations for each social alternative are
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arbitrarily distributed with non-zero variance and a pdf.
The mechanisms in the above three classes are all deterministic and can achieve optimal efficiency.
Furthermore, the mechanisms do not use any payments, and do not need to depend on a “common
prior” or the players’ beliefs. As long as the players’ beliefs satisfy our distributional assumptions,
our results on approximate truthfulness still hold. Moreover, as long as the input of the mechanism
satisfies our distributional assumptions, the privacy of each player is protected.
Obtaining Actual Truthfulness. Recall that in [NST12], the authors added a “reaction stage”
to the standard mechanism design model in order to achieve actual truthfulness from approximate
truthfulness (which is obtained via differential privacy). We can also use this model and their
techniques to obtain actual truthfulness in our results. In Section 5, we describe an alternative
model where actual truthfulness can be obtained from approximate truthfulness. In this new model,
the mechanism is given the ability to verify the truthfulness of a small number of players. This
model is simple to use and is realistic in settings where the truthfulness of a player can be verified
objectively (e.g., income, expenses, age, address).
2 Preliminaries and Definitions
For any k ∈ N, we will use [k] to denote the set {1, . . . , k}. We consider a mechanism design
environment consisting of the following components:
• A number n of players; we will often use [n] to denote the set of n players.
• A type space T ; each player has a private type from the type space T . (We assume that each
player has the same type space T .)
• A distribution T over the type space T ; the players’ private types are independently drawn
from this distribution. (For simplicity, we assume that the type for each player has the same
distribution T ; however, most of our results can be generalized to the case where the type for
each player may follow a different distribution.)
• A set S of social alternatives; for convenience, we assume that S is finite.
• For each player i, a utility function ui : T × S → R; for t ∈ T and s ∈ S, ui(t, s) represents
the utility that player i receives if player i has type t and the social alternative s is chosen.
We will focus on direct revelation mechanisms where each player reports his/her type. Therefore,
a mechanism is a function M : T n → S, and a (pure) strategy for player i is a function σi : T → T
that maps true types to announced types. For convenience, whenever we refer to a mechanism
M : T n → S, we assume that it is associated with an environment as described above.
Remark. For simplicity of presentation, we have assumed in our model that there is a “common
prior”, i.e., it is common knowledge that the player types are distributed according to T n. However,
most of our results can be easily generalized to a setting where each player has a different belief
about the other players’ types (as long as the belief satisfies certain distributional assumptions,
which is needed even in the common prior setting). Also, the mechanisms that we give do not
need to depend on a common prior or the players’ beliefs. As long as the players’ beliefs satisfy
our distributional assumptions, our results on approximate truthfulness still hold. Furthermore,
as long as the input of the mechanism satisfies our distributional assumptions, the privacy of each
player is protected by our results on privacy.
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2.1 Equilibrium Concepts
In this section, we will define several equilibrium concepts based on the standard Bayes-Nash equi-
librium (see, e.g., [FT91]). These equilibrium concepts will be used to define various notions of
truthfulness. Our definitions build on the ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium, which is a relaxation of the
Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the sense that an ǫ margin is allowed in the Nash conditions. This
relaxation reflects the assumption that players will not deviate from the equilibrium if gains from
deviation are sufficiently small. In this paper, we also refer to ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibria as approxi-
mate Bayes-Nash equilibria. For more information about various notions of approximate equilibria,
see [NRTV07, SLB09, Tij81].
Our equilibrium concepts strengthen the ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We chose two strength-
enings to address the following weaknesses of Nash equilibria. Firstly, a player’s part of a Nash
equilibrium is only guaranteed to be a best-response if all the other players are playing their parts
of the equilibrium. In other words, a Nash equilibrium cannot tolerate players deviating from their
equilibrium strategy — if there is one irrational person in the system, the equilibrium breaks down.
Deviations are especially problematic in ǫ-equilibria, where there is less confidence that everyone
would play their part of the equilibrium. Secondly, a Nash equilibrium is not resilient to deviations
by more than one person; coalitions of players can have profitable deviations from the equilibrium.
To address the first problem, we strengthen the Nash conditions such that even if up to k players
deviate from the equilibrium, everyone else’s best-response is still to adhere to their part of the
equilibrium. In other words, the equilibrium tolerates arbitrary deviations of k individuals.
Definition 1 (k-tolerant ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is
a k-tolerant ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for every I ⊆ [n] with |I| ≤ k, every possible announced
types t′I ∈ T |I| for I, every player i /∈ I, and every pair of types ti, t′i for player i, we have
EtJ [ui(ti,M(σi(ti), t
′
I ,σJ(tJ)))] ≥ EtJ [ui(ti,M(t′i, t′I ,σJ(tJ)))]− ǫ,
where J = [n] \ (I ∪ {i}) and tJ ∼ T |J |.
We note that k-tolerance is distinct from the notion of k-immunity as defined in [ADHG06,
Hal08], which guarantees that when up to k people deviate from the equilibrium, the utilities of
the non-deviating players do not decrease.
The second problem mentioned above is addressed by r-resilience (see, e.g., [NRTV07, Hal08]).
A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is r-resilient if for any group of size at most r, there does not exist a
deviation of the group such that any member of the coalition has increased utility.
Definition 2 (r-resilient ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is
an r-resilient ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for every coalition C ⊆ [n] with |C| ≤ r, every true types
tC ∈ T |C| for C, every player i ∈ C, and every possible announced types t′C ∈ T |C| for C, we have
Et−C [ui(ti,M(σC(tC),σ−C(t−C)))] ≥ Et−C [ui(ti,M(t′C ,σ−C(t−C)))]− ǫ,
where t−C ∼ T n−|C|.
It is not hard to see that resilience and tolerance can be independently violated, and hence
neither implies the other. Just as the authors in [ADHG06, Hal08] combine immunity and resilience,
we consider the combination of tolerance and resilience. Roughly speaking, a (k, r)-persistent Bayes-
Nash equilibrium is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium that is r-resilient (protects against coalitions of size
r), even in the presence of up to k individuals that are deviating arbitrarily from the equilibrium.
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Definition 3 ((k, r)-persistent ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn)
is a (k, r)-persistent ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for every I ⊆ [n] with |I| ≤ k, every possible
announced types t′I ∈ T |I| for I, every coalition C ⊆ [n] \ I with |C| ≤ r, every true types tC ∈ T |C|
for C, every player i ∈ C, and every possible announced types t′C ∈ T |C| for C, we have
EtJ [ui(ti,M(σC(tC), t
′
I ,σJ(tJ)))] ≥ EtJ [ui(ti,M(t′C , t′I ,σJ(tJ)))]− ǫ,
where J = [n] \ (I ∪C) and tJ ∼ T |J |.
2.2 Notions of Truthfulness
In this section, we define various notions of truthfulness based on the equilibrium concepts from the
previous section. Recall that a mechanism is Bayes-Nash truthful if the truthful strategy profile is
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Similarly, a mechanism is ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful if the truthful strategy
profile is an ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By using the equilibrium concepts from the previous section,
we can obtain stronger notions of truthfulness.
Definition 4 ([k-tolerant]/[r-resilient]/[(k, r)-persistent] ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful). A mech-
anism is k-tolerant ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful if the truthful strategy profile is a k-tolerant ǫ-Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. Similarly, a mechanism is r-resilient (resp., (k, r)-persistent) ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful if
the truthful strategy profile is an r-resilient (resp., (k, r)-persistent) ǫ-Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
It is easy to see that if a mechanism is (k, r)-persistent ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful, then it is also
k-tolerant ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful and r-resilient ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful. In many settings, it is
reasonable to believe that players in an ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful mechanism will be truthful, since (1)
truth-telling is simple while computing a profitable deviation can be costly (see, e.g., [HP10]), and
(2) lying can induce a psychological (morality) cost. Indeed, there are many results in mechanism
design that assume that approximate truthfulness is enough to ensure that players will be truthful
(see, e.g., [MT07, BP11, KPS04, Sch04]).
3 Privacy for Bayesian Mechanism Design
In this section, we describe and define Bayesian differential privacy, which is a natural adaptation
of differential privacy [DMNS06, Dwo06] to the Bayesian mechanism design setting. Roughly
speaking, differential privacy requires that when one person’s input to the mechanism is changed,
the output distribution of the mechanism changes very little (here, the mechanism is randomized).
We now describe Bayesian differential privacy. We first note that even though the players’ true
types are drawn from some distribution T , if all the players are non-truthful and announce a type
independently of their true type, then the input of the mechanism is no longer distributional and
we are essentially in the same scenario as in (worst-case) differential privacy. Thus, it is necessary
to make some assumptions on the strategies of the players, so that the input of the mechanism
contains at least some randomness.
In our notion of Bayesian differential privacy, we assume that at least some players (e.g., a con-
stant fraction of the players) are truthful so that their announced types have the same distribution
as their true types. This assumption is not unreasonable, since we later show that if a mechanism
is Bayesian differentially private, then the mechanism is automatically persistent approximately
truthful, so we expect that most players would be truthful anyway. In particular, if we have an
equilibrium where most players are truthful, then privacy is achieved at this equilibrium.
6
Roughly speaking, (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially privacy requires that when a player i changes
his/her announced type, the output distribution of the mechanism changes by at most an (ǫ, δ)
amount, assuming that at most k players are non-truthful (possibly lying in an arbitrary way). This
implies that the mechanism leaks very little information about each player’s announced type, so each
player’s privacy is protected. The mechanism is assumed to be deterministic, so the randomness
of the output is from the randomness of the types of the truthful players. (One can also consider
randomized mechanisms, but we chose to focus on deterministic mechanisms in this paper.)
Definition 5 ((k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differential privacy). A mechanism M : T n → S is (k, ǫ, δ)-
Bayesian differentially private if for every player i ∈ [n], every subset I ⊆ [n] \ {i} of players with
|I| ≤ k, every pair of types ti, t′i ∈ T for player i, and every t′I ∈ T |I|, the following holds: Let
J = [n] \ (I ∪ {i}) (the remaining players) and tJ ∼ T |J |; then, for every Y ⊆ S, we have
Pr[M(ti, t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ · Pr[M(t′i, t′I , tJ) ∈ Y ] + δ,
where the probabilities are over tJ ∼ T |J |.
The parameter k controls how many non-truthful players the mechanism can tolerate while
satisfying privacy; k can be a function of n (the number of players), such as k = n2 . One can even
view the non-truthful players as being controlled/known by an adversary that is trying to learn
information about a player i’s type; as long as the adversary controls/knows at most k people,
player i’s privacy is still protected. The parameters ǫ and δ bound the amount of information
about each person’s (announced) type that can be “leaked” by the mechanism. Since the above
definition of Bayesian differential privacy is a natural adaptation of differential privacy to Bayesian
mechanism design, and since differential privacy is a well-motivated and well-accepted notion of
privacy, we will not further elaborate on the details of the above definition.
Our definition of (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differential privacy has some similarities to the notion of
(ǫ, δ)-noiseless privacy (for databases) introduced and studied in [BBG+11]. However, there are
some subtle but significant differences between the two definitions, so the results in this paper
do not follow from the theorems and proofs in [BBG+11]. Nevertheless, the ideas and techniques
in [BBG+11], and for (ǫ, δ)-noiseless privacy in general, may be useful for designing Bayesian
differentially private mechanisms.
It is known that differentially private mechanisms are approximately (dominant-strategy) truth-
ful (see [MT07]). Similarly, Bayesian differentially private mechanisms are persistent approximate
Bayes-Nash truthful.
Theorem 6 (Bayesian differential privacy =⇒ persistent approximate truthfulness).
Suppose the utility functions are bounded by α > 0, i.e., the utility function for each player i is
ui : T × S → [−α,α]. Let M be any mechanism that is (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially private.
Then, M satisfies the following properties:
1. M is k-tolerant (ǫ+ 2δ)(2α)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
2. For every 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1, M is r-resilient (rǫ+ 2rδ)(2α)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
3. For every 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1, M is (k − r + 1, r)-persistent (rǫ+ 2rδ)(2α)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
See Appendix A for the proof of Theorem 6.
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4 Efficient Bayesian Mechanisms with Privacy and Persistent Ap-
proximate Truthfulness
In this section, we present three classes of mechanisms that achieve both Bayesian differential
privacy and persistent approximate truthfulness.
4.1 Histogram Mechanisms
We first present a broad class of mechanisms, called histogram mechanisms, that achieve Bayesian
differential privacy and persistent approximate truthfulness. Given a partition P = {B1, . . . , Bm}
of the type space T with m blocks (ordered in some way), a histogram with respect to P is simply
a vector in (Z≥0)m that specifies a count for each block of the partition. Given a partition P , let
HP denote the set of all histograms with respect to P ; given a vector t of types, let HP (t) be the
histogram formed from t by simply counting how many components (types) of t belong to each
block of the partition P .
We now define what we mean by a histogram mechanism. Intuitively, a histogram mechanism is
a mechanism that, on input a vector of types, computes the histogram from the types with respect
to some partition P , and then applies any function f : HP → S to the histogram to choose a social
alternative in S.
Definition 7 (Histogram mechanism). Let P be any partition of the type space T . A mechanism
M : T n → S is a histogram mechanism with respect to P if there exists a function f : HP → S
such that M(t) = f(HP (t)) ∀ t ∈ T n.
The following theorem states that any histogram mechanism with bounded utility functions
and positive expected count for each bin is both Bayesian differentially private and persistent
approximately truthful.
Theorem 8 (Histogram mechanisms are private and persistent approximately truthful).
Let M : T n → S be any histogram mechanism with respect to some partition P of T . Let pmin =
minB∈P Prt∼T [t ∈ B], and suppose that pmin > 0. Then, for every 0 ≤ k ≤ n−2 and 4pmin·(n−k−1) ≤
ǫ ≤ 1, M satisfies the following properties with δ = e−Ω((n−k)·pmin·ǫ2):
1. Privacy: M is (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially private.
2. Persistent approximate truthfulness: Suppose the utility functions are bounded by α > 0, i.e.,
the utility function for each player i is ui : T × S → [−α,α]. Then, for every 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1,
M is (k − r + 1, r)-persistent (rǫ+ 2rδ)(2α)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
The proof idea roughly works as follows. Persistent approximate truthfulness follows from
Bayesian differential privacy and Theorem 6, so we only have to show that the histogram mechanism
is Bayesian differentially private. Since the histogram mechanism chooses a social alternative based
only on the computed histogram, it suffices to show that the computed histogram is Bayesian
differentially private. Now, consider a player i changing his/her announced type from ti to t
′
i, and
let Bi and B
′
i be the two bins that contain ti and t
′
i, respectively. When player i changes from ti
to t′i, the count for bin Bi decreases by 1, and the count for bin B
′
i increases by 1. However, the
randomness of the other players’ types can easily blur/smooth out this change.
The histogram formed by the other players’ types follows a multinomial distribution, which is
relatively smooth near its expectation, i.e., the probability masses of two nearby histograms are
relatively close to each other, provided that the two histograms are near the expectation. Now,
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we observe that by Chernoff bounds, the formed histogram will be near the expectation with high
probability. Together, these facts imply that the distribution of the computed histogram when
player i reports ti is relatively close to the distribution when player i reports t
′
i. This shows that
the computed histogram is Bayesian differentially private.
Proof. The second property follows from the first property and Theorem 6. We now show the first
property.
Let i ∈ [n], let I ⊆ [n] \ {i} with |I| ≤ k, let ti, t′i ∈ T , let t′I ∈ T |I|, and let Y ⊆ S. Let
J = [n] \ (I ∪ {i}) and tJ ∼ T |J |. We need to show that
Pr[M(ti, t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(t′i, t′I , tJ) ∈ Y ] + δ,
which is equivalent to
Pr[f(HP (ti, t
′
I , tJ)) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ Pr[f(HP (t′i, t′I , tJ)) ∈ Y ]
for some function f : HP → S. To show this, it is easy to see that it suffices to show that for every
W ⊆ HP ,
Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈W ] ≤ eǫ Pr[HP (t′i, tJ) ∈W ] + δ. (1)
To this end, fix W ⊆ HP . Let the partition P = {P1, . . . , Pm}, and let pj = Prt∼T [t ∈ Pj ]. Let b
be the index j of the partition Pj that contains ti, and let b
′ be the index j of the partition Pj that
contains t′i. We can assume that b 6= b′, since otherwise (1) would hold trivially. Given a histogram
w, let wj be the count of the bin Pj in w. Let n
′ = |J |. Let B be the set of all histograms w of
size n′ + 1 (i.e., sum of the counts is n′ + 1) such that wb > pbn′ · eǫ/2 or wb′ < pb′n′ · e−ǫ/2. Now,
observe that
Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈W ] = Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈W ∩B] + Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈W ∩B]
≤ Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈W ∩B] + Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈ B]. (2)
Claim 9. For each w ∈W ∩B,
Pr[HP (ti, tJ) = w] ≤ eǫ Pr[HP (t′i, tJ) = w].
Proof of claim. Fix w ∈W ∩B. From the pmf of the multinomial distribution, we have
Pr[HP (ti, tJ) = w]
Pr[HP (t′i, tJ) = w]
=
wb
wb′
· pb′
pb
=
wb
pbn′
· pb′n
′
wb′
≤ eǫ/2 · eǫ/2 = eǫ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that w /∈ B.
Claim 10. Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈ B] ≤ δ.
Proof of claim. Observe that
Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈ B] = Pr[HP (ti, tJ)b > pbn′eǫ/2 or HP (ti, tJ)b′ < pb′n′e−ǫ/2]
≤ Pr[HP (ti, tJ)b > pbn′eǫ/2] + Pr[HP (ti, tJ)b′ < pb′n′e−ǫ/2]
= Pr[1 +Bin(n′, pb) > pbn′eǫ/2] + Pr[Bin(n′, pb′) < pb′n′e−ǫ/2]
= Pr[Bin(n′, pb) > pbn′(eǫ/2 − (pbn′)−1)] + Pr[Bin(n′, pb′) < pb′n′e−ǫ/2]
≤ exp(−Ω(pbn′ · (eǫ/2 − (pbn′)−1 − 1)2)) + exp(−Ω(pb′n′ · (1− e−ǫ/2)2))
≤ exp(−Ω(pbn′ · ǫ2)) + exp(−Ω(pb′n′ · ǫ2))
≤ exp(−Ω(pmin · (n− k) · ǫ2)),
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where Bin(n′, p) is a binomial random variable with n′ trials and success probability p, and the
second inequality follows from Chernoff bounds.
Now, by the above two claims, we have from (2) that
Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈W ] ≤ Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈W ∩B] + Pr[HP (ti, tJ) ∈ B]
≤ eǫ Pr[HP (t′i, tJ) ∈W ∩B] + δ
≤ eǫ Pr[HP (t′i, tJ) ∈W ] + δ.
This completes the proof.
One possible partition of the type space is the one where there is a distinct block for each type.
Thus, Theorem 8 covers the case where the choice of the mechanism depends only on the number
of players that reported each type, and not their identities. In fact, given any partition, one can
redefine the type space so that the new types are the blocks of the partition. This means we could
always redefine the type space and simply use the partition where there is a distinct block for each
type in the new type space. However, we believe it is more natural to preserve the original, natural
type space, and to allow the histogram mechanism to use an appropriate partition of the type
space.
In Theorem 8, since the histogram mechanism is not modified in any way to satisfy privacy and
persistent approximate truthfulness, all properties of the mechanism (e.g., efficiency, truthfulness,
individual rationality, etc.) are preserved. We now give a simple example to illustrate Theorem 8.
Example 11 (Voting with Multiple Candidates). Suppose we are trying to select a winner
from a finite set of candidates (e.g., political candidates) using the plurality rule (i.e., each voter
casts one vote and the candidate with the most votes wins). The set of social alternatives is the
set of candidates, and the natural type space is the set of all preference orders over the candidates.
However, we can partition the type space such that each block b represents a candidate cb, and all
the types with cb as their top choice belong to block b. Intuitively, announcing a type that belongs
to block b can be understood as casting a vote for candidate cb. Using this partition, we can define
a histogram mechanism that implements the plurality rule. We call this mechanism the plurality
mechanism.
It is well known that the plurality rule is not strategy-proof when there are more than two
candidates (see, e.g., [SLB09]). However, by Theorem 8, the plurality mechanism is Bayesian dif-
ferentially private and persistent approximate Bayes-Nash truthful. For example, if n is the number
of voters, and each candidate is expected to get at least some constant fraction of the votes, then
from Theorem 8 we can conclude that the plurality mechanism is (Ω(n), n−2/5, e−Ω( 5
√
n))-Bayesian
differentially private and (Ω(n),Ω( 5
√
n))-persistent O( 15√n)-Bayes-Nash truthful. This means that
even if a constant fraction of the voters lie arbitrarily, and coalitions of size O( 5
√
n) can be formed,
the privacy of each voter is still protected, and any possible gain from lying is bounded by O( 15√n).
As n→∞, any possible gain from lying converges to 0, making the plurality mechanism persistent
Bayes-Nash truthful.
Example 12 (Discrete Facility Location in Two Dimensions with Multiple Facilities).
Facility location has been given much attention in the literature on privacy in mechanism design
(see, e.g., [CCK+11, Xia11, NST12]). The standard facility location problem involves placing m
facilities (e.g. public libraries) within a region, so the set of social alternatives is the set of all
ways to place the m facilities. Each player’s type is his location within the region, and his utility is
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determined by the distance from his location to the nearest facility. Usually, the goal is to minimize
the sum of the players’ distances to their nearest facility.
If we discretize the type space (i.e., the region), perhaps such that each city block is a type,
we get a histogram of population counts in each city block. Using a histogram mechanism, the
mechanism designer can use any criteria to select the facility locations while achieving Bayesian
differential privacy and persistent approximate truthfulness.
4.2 Mechanisms for Two Social Alternatives
Although histogram mechanisms are useful in many settings, in order to apply Theorem 8 to get
good parameters, the number of bins cannot be extremely large. We now present a class of mech-
anisms that do not require the partitioning of types into bins, but are still Bayesian differentially
private and persistent approximately truthful. Roughly speaking, the following theorem states that
any mechanism that makes a choice between two social alternatives {A,B} based on the difference
between the sums of two functions u(·, A) and u(·, B) on the types is Bayesian differentially private
and persistent approximately truthful.
Theorem 13 (Private and persistent approximately truthful mechanisms for two social
alternatives). Let S = {A,B} be any set of two social alternatives, let T be the type space, let T
be any distribution over T , and let u : T × S → [−β, β] be any function (e.g., a utility function for
all the players). Suppose the random variable u(t, A)−u(t, B), where t ∼ T , has non-zero variance
and a probability density function.
Let M : T n → S be any mechanism such that
M(t) = f
(
n∑
i=1
u(ti, A) −
n∑
i=1
u(ti, B)
)
for some function f : R → S. Then, for every 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 and 0 < ǫ ≤ 1, M satisfies the
following properties with ǫ′ = ǫ+O(
√
ln(n−k)
n−k ) and δ = O(
1
ǫ
√
n−k ):
1. Privacy: M is (k, ǫ′, δ)-Bayesian differentially private.
2. Persistent approximate truthfulness: Suppose the utility functions are bounded by α > 0, i.e.,
the utility function for each player i is ui : T × S → [−α,α]. Then, for every 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1,
M is (k − r + 1, r)-persistent (rǫ′ + 2rδ)(2α)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
The proof idea roughly works as follows. Persistent approximate truthfulness follows from
Bayesian differential privacy and Theorem 6, so we only have to show that the mechanism M
is Bayesian differentially private. Since the mechanism chooses a social alternative based only
on
∑n
i=1 u(ti, A) −
∑n
i=1 u(ti, B) =
∑n
i=1(u(ti, A) − u(ti, B)), it suffices to show that this sum is
Bayesian differentially private. Now, consider a player i changing his/her announced type from ti
to t′i. This changes the sum by at most 4β. However, the randomness of the other players’ types
can easily blur/smooth out this change.
After shifting and rescaling the terms of the sum appropriately, as n → ∞, the pdf of the
sum obtained from the other players’ types converges uniformly to the pdf of the standard normal
distribution (this follows from various “local limit theorems”; e.g., see Statement 5 in Section 4
of Chapter VII in [Pet75]). Thus, the standard normal distribution is a good approximation of
the distribution of the sum obtained from the other players’ types. Now, we note that the pdf of
the standard normal distribution is relatively smooth near its expectation 0, i.e., the probability
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density at two nearby points is relatively close to each other, provided that the two points are near
the expectation 0. Now, we observe that a sample from the standard normal distribution will be
near its expectation 0 with high probability. Together, these facts imply that the distribution of the
computed sum when player i reports ti is relatively close to the distribution when player i reports
t′i. This shows that the computed sum is Bayesian differentially private.
Proof. The second property follows from the first property and Theorem 6. We now show the first
property.
Let i ∈ [n], let I ⊆ [n] \ {i} with |I| ≤ k, let ti, t′i ∈ T , let t′I ∈ T |I|, and let Y ⊆ S. Let
J = [n] \ (I ∪ {i}), tJ ∼ T |J |, and n′ = |J |. Given a type t ∈ T , let g(t) = u(t, A) − u(t, B). Given
a vector v = (v1, . . . , vm) of types in T , let U(v) =
∑m
j=1 g(vj). We need to show that
Pr[M(ti, t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ
′
Pr[M(t′i, t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] + δ,
which is equivalent to
Pr[f
(
U(ti, t
′
I , tJ)
) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ′ Pr[f (U(t′i, t′I , tJ)) ∈ Y ] + δ (1)
for some function f : R→ S. Let
h(t) =
g(t) − Et′∼T [g(t′)]
(Vart′∼T [g(t′)])1/2
,
and given a vector v = (v1, . . . , vm) of types in T , let
V (v) =
m∑
j=1
h(vj).
We note that Et′∼T [h(t′)] = 0 and Vart′∼T [h(t′)] = 1. To show (1), it is easy to see that it suffices
to show that for every measurable set W ⊆ R,
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈W
]
≤ eǫ′ Pr
[
V (t′i, tJ)√
n′
∈W
]
+ δ. (2)
To this end, fix a measurable set W ⊆ R. We will need to use the following lemma later:
Lemma 14. Let fn′ be the pdf of
V (tJ )√
n′
= 1√
n′
∑
j∈J h(tj) (where each tj ∼ T independently), and
let φ be the pdf of the standard normal distribution. Then, fn′ converges uniformly to φ as follows:
sup
x∈R
|fn′(x)− φ(x)| ≤ c1√
n′
,
where c1 > 0 is some (universal) constant.
Proof of lemma. This lemma follows immediately from various “local limit theorems” (e.g., see
Statement 5 in Section 4 of Chapter VII in [Pet75]).
Let c1 be the constant in the above lemma, let γ =
eǫ−1
eǫ+1 , and let σ
2 = Vart′∼T [g(t′)]. Let
B =
w ∈ R : |w| >
√√√√2 ln( γ√n′
c1
√
2π
)
− 4β
σ
√
n′
 .
Now, observe that
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈W
]
≤ Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈W ∩B
]
+ Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈ B
]
. (3)
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Lemma 15. For each w ∈W ∩B,
Pr[V (ti, tJ)/
√
n′ = w]
Pr[V (t′i, tJ)/
√
n′ = w]
≤ exp
(
ǫ+O
(√
lnn′√
n′
))
.
Proof of lemma. Fix w ∈ W ∩ B. Let φ be the pdf of the standard normal distribution. By the
previous lemma, we have
Pr[V (ti, tJ)/
√
n′ = w]
Pr[V (t′i, tJ)/
√
n′ = w]
=
Pr[ 1√
n′
∑
j∈J h(tj) = w − h(ti)/
√
n′]
Pr[ 1√
n′
∑
j∈J h(tj) = w − h(t′i)/
√
n′]
≤
φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′) + c1√
n′
φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′)− c1√
n′
, (4)
where c1 ≥ 0 is some constant. Now, we note that
c1√
n′
≤ γ · φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′), (5)
since γ ·φ(w−h(ti)/
√
n′) = γ√
2π
exp
(
−12
(
w − h(ti)√
n′
)2) ≥ γ√
2π
exp
(
−12
(
|w| + |h(ti)|√
n′
)2)
, |h(ti)| ≤
4β
σ , and |w|+ 4βσ√n′ ≤
√
2 ln
(
γ
√
n′
c1
√
2π
)
(since w /∈ B). Similarly, we also have
c1√
n′
≤ γ · φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′). (6)
Now, combining (4) with (5) and (6), we have
Pr[V (ti, tJ)/
√
n′ = w]
Pr[V (t′i, tJ)/
√
n′ = w]
≤ φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′) + γ · φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′)
φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′)− γ · φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′)
=
1 + γ
1− γ ·
φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′)
φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′)
= exp(ǫ) · exp
(
1
2
·
((
w − h(t
′
i)√
n′
)2
−
(
w − h(ti)√
n′
)2))
≤ exp(ǫ) · exp
(
1
2
·
∣∣∣∣h(ti)√n′ − h(t
′
i)√
n′
∣∣∣∣ · ∣∣∣∣2w − h(t′i)√n′ − h(ti)√n′
∣∣∣∣)
≤ exp(ǫ) · exp
1
2
· 8β
σ
√
n′
·
2
√√√√2 ln( γ√n′
c1
√
2π
)
≤ exp
(
ǫ+O
(√
lnn′√
n′
))
,
where the second last inequality follows from the fact that the function h is bounded by 4βσ (in
absolute value) and |w|+ 4β
σ
√
n′
≤
√
2 ln
(
γ
√
n′
c1
√
2π
)
(since w /∈ B).
We will need to use the following lemma later:
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Lemma 16. Let Fn′ be the cdf of
V (tJ )√
n′
= 1√
n′
∑
j∈J h(tj) (where each tj ∼ T independently), and
let Φ be the cdf of the standard normal distribution. Then, V (tJ )√
n′
converges in distribution uniformly
to the standard normal random variable as follows:
sup
x∈R
|Fn′(x)− Φ(x)| = O
(
1√
n′
)
.
Proof of lemma. This lemma follows immediately from the Berry-Esseen theorem.
Lemma 17.
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈ B
]
≤ O
(
1
ǫ
√
n′
)
.
Proof of lemma. Let x =
√
2 ln
(
γ
√
n′
c1
√
2π
)
− 4β
σ
√
n′
, let Φ be the cdf of the standard normal distribution,
and let X ∼ N (0, 1). Observe that
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈ B
]
≤ Pr
[∣∣∣∣h(ti)√n′
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣V (tJ)√n′
∣∣∣∣ > x]
≤ 1− Pr
[∣∣∣∣V (tJ)√n′
∣∣∣∣ ≤ x− 4βσ√n′
]
≤ 1−
(
Pr
[
V (tJ)√
n′
≤ x− 4β
σ
√
n′
]
− Pr
[
V (tJ)√
n′
≤ −
(
x− 4β
σ
√
n′
)])
≤ 1−
(
Φ
(
x− 4β
σ
√
n′
)
− Φ
(
−
(
x− 4β
σ
√
n′
))
−O
(
1√
n′
))
= 1− Pr
[
|X| ≤ x− 4β
σ
√
n′
]
+O
(
1√
n′
)
= Pr
[
|X| > x− 4β
σ
√
n′
]
+O
(
1√
n′
)
,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that |h(ti)| ≤ 4βσ , and the fourth inequality follows
from the previous lemma. Now, by Mill’s inequality, we have Pr[|X| ≥ y] ≤
√
2
π · 1ye−y
2/2 for every
y > 0, so
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈ B
]
≤
√
2
π
· 1
x− 4β
σ
√
n′
exp
(
−1
2
(
x− 4β
σ
√
n′
)2)
+O
(
1√
n′
)
= O
(
1
γ
√
n′
)
= O
(
1
ǫ
√
n′
)
.
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Now, by Lemmas 15 and 17, we have from (3) that
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈W
]
≤ Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈W ∩B
]
+ Pr
[
V (ti, tJ)√
n′
∈ B
]
≤ exp
(
ǫ+O
(√
lnn′√
n′
))
· Pr
[
V (t′i, tJ)√
n′
∈W ∩B
]
+O
(
1
ǫ
√
n′
)
≤ exp
(
ǫ+O
(√
ln(n− k)√
n− k
))
· Pr
[
V (t′i, tJ)√
n′
∈W
]
+O
(
1
ǫ
√
n− k
)
.
This completes the proof.
The mechanism in Theorem 13 chooses a social alternative by applying some function f on
the difference between
∑n
i=1 u(ti, A) and
∑n
i=1 u(ti, B). We note that the mechanism may already
have certain properties, such as efficiency, truthfulness, individual rationality, etc.; by Theorem 13,
this mechanism also satisfies privacy and persistent approximate truthfulness, in addition to the
original properties that it already satisfies. One obvious application of Theorem 13 is to let u be
a common utility function for the players, where the utility of player i with type ti is u(ti, A) if A
is chosen, and is u(ti, B) if B is chosen. If we define f : R → S such that f(x) = A if and only if
x > 0, then the mechanism maximizes social welfare.
Example 18 (Public Project). The canonical public project problem (see, e.g. [NRTV07]) is
that the government is trying to decide whether it should spend cost c to build a certain public
project (e.g., a bridge). We can apply Theorem 13 to this problem by letting social alternative A
represent building the project, and B represent not building it. A player’s type t ∈ [−α,α] is the
utility that he/she will gain from the public project being built. Since not building the project
results in a utility of 0 to everyone, we let u(t, B) = 0 for all t, and u(t, A) = t for all t.
In this case, if the distribution T has a density function and nonzero variance then so does
u(t, A) − u(t, B). We can then define a mechanism that makes a choice based on the cost c and
the sum of the utilities u(t, A) over the players. By Theorem 13, this mechanism is Bayesian differ-
entially private and persistent approximately truthful. For example, if n is the number of players,
then from Theorem 13 we can conclude that the mechanism is (Ω(n), O( 14√n), O(
1
4
√
n
))-Bayesian
differentially private and (Ω(n),Ω( 8
√
n))-persistent O( 18√n)-Bayes-Nash truthful. This means that
even if a constant fraction of the players announce their types arbitrarily, and coalitions of size
O( 8
√
n) can be formed, the privacy of each player is still protected, and any possible gain from
lying is bounded by O( 18√n). As n → ∞, any possible gain from lying converges to 0, making the
mechanism persistent Bayes-Nash truthful.
By building the project if and only if the sum of the utilities for A exceeds the cost c, we have
a mechanism that maximizes social welfare (here, we include the government’s utility as part of
the social welfare). We also note that although the VCG mechanism can be used in this setting, it
uses payments, which may not be appropriate.
The functions u in Theorem 13 can also be some arbitrary objective function, such as utiliza-
tion/revenue, as in the next example.
Example 19 (Golf Course vs. Low Cost Swimming Pool). Suppose a recreational club
wants to build either a golf course or a low-cost swimming pool. Based on past experience, a
member’s expected utilization of a golf course is a function u(·, A) that is increasing with respect
to his income. On the other hand, a member’s expected utilization of a low-cost swimming pool
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is a function u(·, B) that is decreasing with respect to his income. With this model, the club can
use a mechanism that first asks each member i to report his annual income ti, then computes the
difference
∑n
i=1 u(ti, A)−
∑n
i=1 u(ti, B), and then makes a choice to maximize expected utilization
(and hence revenue as well). If the random variable u(t, A) − u(t, B), where t ∼ T , has non-zero
variance and a pdf, and the utility functions are bounded, then by Theorem 13, this mechanism is
Bayesian differentially private and persistent approximate Bayes-Nash truthful.
4.3 Social Welfare Mechanisms
In this section, we present a class of mechanisms that make choices based on the social welfare pro-
vided by each social alternative. An important subset of these mechanisms is the set of mechanisms
that maximize social welfare.
In this section, a type t ∈ T is a valuation function that assigns a valuation to each social
alternative s ∈ S. In many settings, it is reasonable to assume that the players’ valuations for each
social alternative follow a normal distribution, since the normal distribution has been frequently
used to model many natural and social phenomena. For convenience of presentation, we will use
the standard normal distribution N (0, 1) in our theorems below. However, our theorems can be
easily generalized to work with arbitrary normal distributions. In any case, it is easy to see that
given any normal distribution over the valuations, the valuations can be translated and scaled to
obtain the standard normal distribution.
For any reasonable mechanism, it is natural to have a bound on the set of possible valuations
— it would be unreasonable to allow a player to report an arbitrarily high or low valuation (e.g.
2100) and single-handedly influence the choice of the mechanism. Therefore, we will restrict the
possible valuations to the interval [−α,α] for some value α > 0. As a result, our type space T will
be the set of all valuation functions t : S → [−α,α]. Furthermore, we will assume that the players’
valuations for each social alternative follow the standard normal distribution. However, because of
the bound on the set of valuations, we will use the truncated standard normal distribution obtained
by conditioning N (0, 1) to lie on the interval [−α,α]. We denote this distribution by N (0, 1)[−α,α].
For simplicity, we will first present the following theorem, which is a special case of our more
general result (Theorem 21). The following theorem states that if each player’s valuation for each
social alternative is distributed as the truncated standard normal distribution N (0, 1)[−α,α], then
any mechanism that makes a choice based on the set of total valuations for each social alternative
is Bayesian differentially private and persistent approximate Bayes-Nash truthful.
Theorem 20 (Social welfare mechanisms). Let S = {s1, . . . , sm} be a set of m social alter-
natives. Let the type space T be the set of all valuation functions t : S → [−α,α] on S, where
α = Θ( 4
√
n). Let T be the distribution over T obtained by letting t(s) ∼ N (0, 1)[−α,α] for each s ∈ S
independently. For each player i, let the utility function for player i be ui(ti, s) = ti(s).
Let swj(t) =
∑n
i=1 ti(sj) be the (reported) social welfare for the social alternative sj. Let M :
T n → S be any mechanism such that
M(t) = f(sw1(t), . . . , swm(t))
for some function f : Rm → S. Then, for every constant c < 1, every k ≤ c·n, and every 0 < ǫ ≤ 1,
M satisfies the following properties with δ = O(e−Ω(
ǫ2
m2
·√n)+ln(m√n)):
1. Privacy: M is (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially private.
2. Persistent approximate truthfulness: For every 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1, M is (k − r + 1, r)-persistent
(rǫ+ 2rδ)(2α)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
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In Theorem 20, swj(t) represents the social welfare that will be achieved if the players’ types
(i.e., valuation functions) are t and the social alternative sj is chosen by the mechanism. Thus,
Theorem 20 says that any mechanism whose choice depends only on the set {swj(t)}j∈[m] of so-
cial welfare values satisfies Bayesian differential privacy and persistent approximate Bayes-Nash
truthfulness, in addition to any properties that it may already satisfy (e.g., efficiency, truthfulness,
individual rationality, etc.). In particular, a mechanism that chooses a social alternative to maxi-
mize social welfare satisfies this requirement and achieves optimal efficiency with respect to social
welfare.
In Theorem 20, the value α at which the standard normal distribution is truncated is chosen
so that the truncated distribution is very close to the untruncated one. This means that even if
we had used the untruncated distribution instead, with high probability no valuation would fall
outside the interval [−α,α].
In the next theorem, we consider a setting where there is a set of available “options”, and we
allow the mechanism to choose any subset of these options. Thus, the set of social alternatives is
the power set of the set of options. To keep the set of valuations tractable, instead of having a
valuation for each social alternative, the players have a valuation for each option. Moreover, we
allow for the flexibility where for each player, only certain options are relevant/applicable to that
player. We capture this flexibility by having a binary weight for each player-option pair. Note
that Theorem 20 is the special case where the set of social alternatives consists of the sets of single
options (i.e., the singletons), and where all options are considered relevant to all players.
The binary weight wi,j associated with player i and option oj indicates whether option oj is
relevant/applicable to player i. wi,j = 1 means that option oj is relevant/applicable to player i,
so player i’s announced valuation is taken into account in the social welfare for option oj . On the
other hand, wi,j = 0 means that player i’s valuation is ignored in the social welfare for option oj .
These weights are known to or set by the mechanism designer. For example, perhaps only people
with low income should have a voice in decisions regarding subsidized housing, and only people
with disabilities should have a say in decisions regarding building accessibility laws. We now state
our next theorem, which generalizes Theorem 20 to this new setting.
Theorem 21 (Social welfare mechanisms with multiple options). Let the set S of social
alternatives be 2O, where O = {o1, . . . , om} is a set of m possible “options”. Let the type space
T be the set of all valuation functions t : O → [−α,α] on O, where α = Θ( 4√n). Let T be the
distribution over T obtained by letting t(o) ∼ N (0, 1)[−α,α] for each option o ∈ O independently.
Suppose the weights {wi,j}i∈[n],j∈[m] satisfy
∑n
i=1wi,j ≥ c1 · n for every option oj , where c1 > 0 is
some constant.
Let swj(t) =
∑n
i=1wi,j · ti(oj) be the (reported) social welfare for option oj . Let M : T n → S be
any mechanism such that
M(t) = f(sw1(t), . . . , swm(t))
for some function f : Rm → S. Then, for every constant c2 < c1, every k ≤ c2 · n, and every
0 < ǫ ≤ 1, M satisfies the following properties with δ = O(e−Ω( ǫ
2
m2
·√n)+ln(m√n)):
1. Privacy: M is (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially private.
2. Persistent approximate truthfulness: Suppose the utility functions are bounded by β > 0, i.e.,
the utility function for each player i is ui : T × S → [−β, β]. Then, for every 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1,
M is (k − r + 1, r)-persistent (rǫ+ 2rδ)(2β)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
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The proof idea roughly works as follows. Persistent approximate truthfulness follows from
Bayesian differential privacy and Theorem 6, so we only have to show that the mechanism M is
Bayesian differentially private.
Since the mechanism chooses a social alternative based only on (sw1(t), . . . , swm(t)), it suf-
fices to show that (sw1(t), . . . , swm(t)) is Bayesian differentially private. Now, consider a player
i changing his/her announced type from ti to t
′
i. This changes only one of the components of
(sw1(t), . . . , swm(t)) by at most 2α. However, the randomness of the other players’ types can easily
blur/smooth out this change. Let Z be the random variable (sw1(t−i), . . . , swm(t−i)) where the
other players’ types t−i are each distributed according to T in the theorem, which uses the trun-
cated standard normal distribution N (0, 1)[−α,α]. Let Z ′ be the same as Z except that instead of
using N (0, 1)[−α,α], Z ′ uses the actual standard normal distribution N (0, 1).
We first note that the distribution of Z is a good approximation of the distribution of Z ′.
Then, we note that Z is a random vector with independent components, each of which has a
normal distribution with Ω(n) variance. Each of these normal distributions is relatively smooth at
every point that is not too far out into the tails, i.e., the probability density at two nearby points is
relatively close to each other, provided that the two points are not too far out into the tails. Now,
we observe that a sample from these normal distributions will not be too far out into the tails with
high probability. Together, these facts imply that the distribution of (sw1(t), . . . , swm(t)) when
player i reports ti is relatively close to the distribution when player i reports t
′
i. This shows that
(sw1(t), . . . , swm(t)) is Bayesian differentially private.
Proof. The second property follows from the first property and Theorem 6. We now show the first
property. Let i ∈ [n], let I ⊆ [n] \ {i} with |I| ≤ k, let ti, t′i ∈ T , let t′I ∈ T |I|, and let Y ⊆ S. Let
J = [n] \ (I ∪{i}) and tJ ∼ T |J |. Let n′ = |J |. Given a subset A of players with reported types tA,
let swℓ(tA) =
∑
j∈Awj,ℓ · tj(oℓ). We need to show that
Pr[M(ti, t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(t′i, t′I , tJ) ∈ Y ] + δ,
which is equivalent to
Pr[f(sw1(ti, t
′
I , tJ), . . . , swm(ti, t
′
I , tJ)) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ Pr[f(sw1(t′i, t′I , tJ), . . . , swm(t′i, t′I , tJ)) ∈ Y ] + δ
(1)
for some function f : R → S. To show (1), it is easy to see that it suffices to show that for every
measurable set W ⊆ Rm,
Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈W ] ≤ eǫ Pr[(sw1(t′i, tJ), . . . , swm(t′i, tJ)) ∈W ] + δ. (2)
To this end, fix a measurable set W ⊆ Rm. Let σ2min = min
ℓ∈[m]
∑
j∈J
wj,ℓ, and let
B = {w ∈ Rm : |wℓ| > ǫσ
2
min
2mα
− α for some ℓ ∈ [m]}.
Now, observe that
Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈W ]
≤ Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈W ∩B] + Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈ B]. (3)
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Lemma 22.
Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈W ∩B]
≤ eǫ Pr[(sw1(t′i, tJ), . . . , swm(t′i, tJ)) ∈W ∩B] +me−Ω(
√
n).
Proof of lemma. LetZ = (sw1(tJ), . . . , swm(tJ)). Let sw(ti) = (sw1(ti), . . . , swm(ti)) and sw(t
′
i) =
(sw1(t
′
i), . . . , swm(t
′
i)). Let W ∩ B − sw(ti) = {w − sw(ti) : w ∈ W ∩ B} and W ∩ B − sw(t′i) =
{w − sw(t′i) : w ∈W ∩B}. Then, it suffices to show that
Pr[Z ∈W ∩B − sw(ti)] ≤ eǫ Pr[Z ∈W ∩B − sw(t′i)] +me−Ω(
√
n). (4)
Let Z ′ = (sw1(t′J), . . . , swm(t
′
J)), where for each j ∈ J , we have t′j(oℓ) ∼ N (0, 1) for every
ℓ ∈ [m] independently.
Recall that for each j ∈ J and ℓ ∈ [m], we have tj(oℓ) ∼ N (0, 1)[−α,α]. Let ftj(oℓ) be the pdf of
tj(oℓ), and let φ be the pdf of the standard normal distribution. Now, for X ∼ N (0, 1), by Mill’s
inequality, we have Pr[|X| ≥ α] ≤
√
2
π (
1
α )e
−Ω(α2) = O( 1
n1/4
e−Ω(
√
n)). Then, it is easy to see that
||ftj(oℓ) − φ||1 =
∫
R
|ftj(oℓ)(x) − φ(x)| dx ≤ O( 1n1/4 e−Ω(
√
n)) for each j ∈ J and ℓ ∈ [m]. It follows
that ||pdf((tj(oℓ))j∈J,ℓ∈[m]) − pdf((t′j(oℓ))j∈J,ℓ∈[m])||1 ≤ O(n′m · 1n1/4 e−Ω(
√
n)) = me−Ω(
√
n), where
pdf(X) denotes the pdf of the random vector X. Thus, for every measurable set W ′ ⊆ Rm, we
have
|Pr[Z ∈W ′]− Pr[Z ′ ∈W ′]| ≤ me−Ω(
√
n). (5)
Let fZ′ be the pdf of Z
′. Then, to show (4), it suffices to show that for every v ∈W ∩B,
fZ′(v − sw(ti))
fZ′(v − sw(t′i))
≤ eǫ, (6)
since then we would have
Pr[Z ∈W ∩B − sw(ti)] ≤ Pr[Z ′ ∈W ∩B − sw(ti)] +me−Ω(
√
n)
≤ eǫ Pr[Z ′ ∈W ∩B − sw(t′i)] +me−Ω(
√
n)
≤ eǫ(Pr[Z ∈W ∩B − sw(t′i)] +me−Ω(
√
n)) +me−Ω(
√
n)
≤ eǫ Pr[Z ∈W ∩B − sw(t′i)] +me−Ω(
√
n),
where the first and third inequality follows from (5), and the second inequality follows from (6).
Thus, we now show (6).
Fix v = (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ W ∩ B. Recall that Z ′ = (sw1(t′J), . . . , swm(t′J)). Thus, we have
Z
′ ∼ (N (0, σ21), . . . ,N (0, σ2m)), where σ2ℓ =
∑
j∈J wj,ℓ for ℓ ∈ [m]. Now, observe that
fZ′(v − sw(ti))
fZ′(v − sw(t′i))
=
m∏
ℓ=1
exp
(
1
2σ2ℓ
· ((vℓ − swℓ(t′i))2 − (vℓ − swℓ(ti))2)
)
≤
m∏
ℓ=1
exp
(
1
2σ2ℓ
· |(swℓ(ti)− swℓ(t′i))| · |2vℓ − swℓ(ti)− swℓ(t′i)|
)
≤
m∏
ℓ=1
exp
(
2α
σ2ℓ
· (|vℓ|+ α)
)
≤
m∏
ℓ=1
exp
(
ǫσ2min
mσ2ℓ
)
≤ exp(ǫ),
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where the third inequality follows from the fact that v /∈ B. This completes the proof of the
lemma.
Lemma 23.
Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈ B] ≤ O(e−Ω(
ǫ2
m2
·√n)+ln(m√n)).
Proof of lemma. By the union bound, we have
Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈ B] ≤
m∑
ℓ=1
Pr[|swℓ(ti, tJ)| > ǫσ
2
min
2αm
− α]. (7)
Now, fix ℓ ∈ [m], and observe that
Pr[|swℓ(ti, tJ)| > ǫσ
2
min
2αm
− α] = Pr[|swℓ(ti) + swℓ(tJ)| > ǫσ
2
min
2αm
− α]
≤ Pr[|swℓ(tJ)| > ǫσ
2
min
2αm
− 2α].
Let swℓ(t
′
J) =
∑
j∈J swℓ(t
′
j), where for each j ∈ J , we have t′j(oℓ) ∼ N (0, 1) independently.
Recall that for each j ∈ J , we have tj(oℓ) ∼ N (0, 1)[−α,α]. Let ftj(oℓ) be the pdf of tj(oℓ), and
let φ be the pdf of the standard normal distribution. Now, for X ∼ N (0, 1), by Mill’s inequality, we
have Pr[|X| ≥ α] ≤
√
2
π (
1
α )e
−Ω(α2) = O( 1
n1/4
e−Ω(
√
n)). Then, it is easy to see that ||ftj(oℓ) − φ||1 =∫
R
|ftj(oℓ)(x) − φ(x)| dx ≤ O( 1n1/4 e−Ω(
√
n)) for each j ∈ J . It follows that ||pdf((tj(oℓ))j∈J) −
pdf((t′j(oℓ))j∈J)||1 ≤ O(n′ · 1n1/4 e−Ω(
√
n)) = O(e−Ω(
√
n)), where pdf(X) denotes the pdf of the
random vector X. Thus, we have
Pr
[
|swℓ(tJ)| > ǫσ
2
min
2αm
− 2α
]
≤ Pr
[
|swℓ(t′J)| >
ǫσ2min
2αm
− 2α
]
+O(e−Ω(
√
n)).
Now, observe that swℓ(t
′
J) ∼ N (0, σ2ℓ ), where σ2ℓ =
∑
j∈J wj,ℓ ≤ n. Then, by Mill’s inequality,
we have Pr[|swℓ(t′J)| ≥ x] ≤
√
2
π · σℓx e−x
2/(2σ2ℓ ) ≤ O(
√
n
x e
−x2/(2n)) for x > 0, so
Pr
[
|swℓ(t′J)| >
ǫσ2min
2αm
− 2α
]
≤ O
 √n
ǫσ2
min
2αm − 2α
· exp
−
(
ǫσ2
min
2αm − 2α
)2
2n


≤ O
(
exp
(
−Ω
(
ǫ2
m2
· √n
)
+ ln
√
n
))
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that α = Θ(n1/4) (from the theorem statement) and
σ2min = Ω(n) (by definition of σ
2
min and the fact that
∑
j∈J wj,ℓ ≥ (c1− c2) ·n− 1 for every ℓ ∈ [m]).
Now, combining the above results, we get
Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈ B] ≤ O(m · e−Ω(
ǫ2
m2
·√n)+ln√n) +O(me−Ω(
√
n))
≤ O(e−Ω( ǫ
2
m2
·√n)+ln(m√n)).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
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Now, by Lemmas 22 and 23, we have from (3) that
Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈W ]
≤ Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈W ∩B] + Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈ B]
≤ eǫ Pr[(sw1(t′i, tJ), . . . , swm(t′i, tJ)) ∈W ∩B] +me−Ω(
√
n) +O(e−Ω(
ǫ2
m2
·√n)+ln(m√n))
≤ eǫ Pr[(sw1(t′i, tJ), . . . , swm(t′i, tJ)) ∈W ] +O(e−Ω(
ǫ2
m2
·√n)+ln(m√n)).
This completes the proof.
In Theorem 21, the requirement on the binary weights simply means that each option is rel-
evant/applicable to at least some constant fraction of the players. Note that the persistent ap-
proximate truthfulness result of Theorem 21 requires the players’ utility functions to be bounded
by β > 0. This assumption is needed since the players’ utility functions can actually be arbitrary
functions. However, the most natural way to use Theorem 21 is to let player i’s utility function
be the following: if the chosen social alternative is a singleton {oj}, then the utility for player i is
wi,j · ti(oj); if the chosen social alternative is a set s consisting of two or more options, then the
utility for player i is the sum of the utilities for each singleton subset of s. Alternatively, a player
i’s utility for a social alternative s does not have to be additive in the options that s contains —
the utility function for player i can capture complementarities and substitutabilities of the options
as well. We now give a simple example that illustrates Theorem 21.
Example 24 (Multiple Public Projects). The municipal government would like to spend its
budget surplus of 4 million on the community. There are four options that the government is
considering, each costing 2 million to build: a senior home; a casino; a subsidized housing complex;
or a library. The government would like to find out, on a scale from −α to α, how much each
individual values each option. For each individual i, the government chooses the weights for each
of the options as follows: the weight for the senior home is 1 if and only if individual i is over the
age of 65; the weight for the casino is 1 if and only if individual i is over the age of 19; the weight
for the subsidized housing complex is 1 if and only if individual i is classified as low-income; and
the weight for the library is always 1.
After collecting the valuation functions from the individuals, the government can compute the
social welfare provided by each option, or compute an average utility for each option by dividing its
social welfare by the number of people who have weight 1 for that option. Finally, the government
can choose two of the options to maximize social welfare or average utility.
By Theorem 21, this mechanism is Bayesian differentially private and persistent approximately
truthful. For example, if n is the number of individuals, then from Theorem 21 we can conclude
that the mechanism is (Ω(n), n−1/5, e−Ω(n1/10))-Bayesian differentially private and (Ω(n),Ω(n1/10))-
persistent O( 1
n1/10
)-Bayes-Nash truthful. This means that even if a constant fraction of the individ-
uals report their valuations arbitrarily, and coalitions of size O(n1/10) can be formed, the privacy
of each individual is still protected, and any possible gain from lying is bounded by O( 1
n1/10
). As
n→∞, any possible gain from lying converges to 0, making the mechanism persistent Bayes-Nash
truthful.
Example 25 (Group Auctions). Suppose that m organizations are bidding to host the next
WINE conference, and the conference organizers want to give the hosting privilege to the organiza-
tion whose employees value the privilege the most. The organizers decide to poll the employees of
each organization to see, on a scale from −α to α, how much they value their organization hosting
the event. There are m options, one corresponding to each organization winning the bid. Each
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employee’s type is a valuation function t : O → [−α,α], where t(oj) represents the utility he receives
if organization j wins the bid. Naturally, the employees of each organization should only be able to
specify their valuations for their own organization winning; thus, the weight wi,j for player i and
organization j is 1 if i works at j, and is 0 otherwise.
The organizers can compute the social welfare provided by each option, and then make a choice
to maximize social welfare. Alternatively, to be fair to smaller organizations, the organizers can
maximize the average utility in the winning organization. We can use Theorem 21 to conclude
that such a mechanism is Bayesian differentially private and persistent approximate Bayes-Nash
truthful.
We now generalize Theorem 21 to the case where the players’ valuations for each social alter-
native are arbitrarily distributed with non-zero variance and a pdf, although the parameters are
worse. For convenience, we will restrict the valuations to be in a constant size interval [−α,α],
where α > 0 is a constant instead of α = Θ( 4
√
n) like in Theorem 21. (This restriction improves
the parameters slightly.)
Theorem 26 (Social welfare mechanisms with multiple options and more general dis-
tributions). Let the set S of social alternatives be 2O, where O = {o1, . . . , om} is a set of m
possible “options”. Let the type space T be the set of all valuation functions t : O → [−α,α] on
O, where α > 0 is a constant. For each option o ∈ O, let To be any distribution over [−α,α] with
non-zero variance and a probability density function. Let T be the distribution over T obtained
by letting t(o) ∼ To for each o ∈ O independently. Suppose the weights {wi,j}i∈[n],j∈[m] satisfy∑n
i=1wi,j ≥ c1 · n for every option oj , where c1 > 0 is some constant.
Let swj(t) =
∑n
i=1wi,j · ti(oj) be the (reported) social welfare for option oj . Let M : T n → S be
any mechanism such that
M(t) = f(sw1(t), . . . , swm(t))
for some function f : Rm → S. Then, for every constant c2 < c1, every k ≤ c2 · n, and every
0 < ǫ ≤ 1, M satisfies the following properties with ǫ′ = ǫ+O(m
√
lnn√
n
) and δ = O( m
2
ǫ
√
n
):
1. Privacy: M is (k, ǫ′, δ)-Bayesian differentially private.
2. Persistent approximate truthfulness: Suppose the utility functions are bounded by β > 0, i.e.,
the utility function for each player i is ui : T × S → [−β, β]. Then, for every 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1,
M is (k − r + 1, r)-persistent (rǫ′ + 2rδ)(2β)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 13, except that we now have to deal with a more
general setting (e.g., there are more than two social alternatives, there are options and weights,
etc.).
Proof. The second property follows from the first property and Theorem 6. We now show the first
property.
Let i ∈ [n], let I ⊆ [n] \ {i} with |I| ≤ k, let ti, t′i ∈ T , let t′I ∈ T |I|, and let Y ⊆ S.
Let J = [n] \ (I ∪ {i}) and tJ ∼ T |J |. Given a subset A of players with reported types tA, let
swℓ(tA) =
∑
j∈Awj,ℓ · tj(oℓ). We need to show that
Pr[M(ti, t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ
′
Pr[M(t′i, t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] + δ,
which is equivalent to
Pr[f(sw1(ti, t
′
I , tJ), . . . , swm(ti, t
′
I , tJ)) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ
′
Pr[f(sw1(t
′
i, t
′
I , tJ), . . . , swm(t
′
i, t
′
I , tJ)) ∈ Y ] + δ
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for some function f : Rm → S. It is easy to see that it suffices to show that for every measurable
set Y ′ ⊆ Rm,
Pr[(sw1(ti, tJ), . . . , swm(ti, tJ)) ∈ Y ′] ≤ eǫ′ Pr[(sw1(t′i, tJ), . . . , swm(t′i, tJ)) ∈ Y ′] + δ. (1)
Now, we note that the random variables {swℓ(ti, tJ) : ℓ ∈ [m]} are mutually independent. Thus,
using known “composition theorems/results” for differential privacy (e.g., see [DKM+06, DL09,
DRV10]), it is not hard to see that to prove (1), it suffices to show that for every ℓ ∈ [m] and every
measurable set Y ′ ⊆ R, we have
Pr[swℓ(ti, tJ) ∈ Y ′] ≤ eǫ′/m Pr[swℓ(t′i, tJ) ∈ Y ′] + δ/m. (2)
To this end, fix ℓ ∈ [m]. Given a player j with reported type tj and weight wj,ℓ for option oℓ, let
h(tj) =
swℓ(tj)− wj,ℓ · EX∼Tℓ [X]
(VarX∼Tℓ [X])1/2
,
and given a subset A of players with reported types tA, let
V (tA) =
∑
j∈A
h(tj).
Let J ′ = {j ∈ J : wj,ℓ = 1}, and let n′ = |J ′|. We note that for every j ∈ J ′, we have E[h(tj)] = 0
and Var[h(tj)] = 1. To show (2), it is easy to see that it suffices to show that for every measurable
set W ⊆ R,
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈W
]
≤ eǫ′/m Pr
[
V (t′i, tJ ′)√
n′
∈W
]
+ δ/m. (3)
To this end, fix a measurable set W ⊆ R. We will need to use the following lemma later:
Lemma 27. Let fn′ be the pdf of
V (tJ′)√
n′
= 1√
n′
∑
j∈J ′ h(tj) (where each tj ∼ T independently), and
let φ be the pdf of the standard normal distribution. Then, fn′ converges uniformly to φ as follows:
sup
x∈R
|fn′(x)− φ(x)| ≤ c1√
n′
,
where c1 > 0 is some (universal) constant.
Proof of lemma. This lemma follows immediately from various “local limit theorems” (e.g., see
Statement 5 in Section 4 of Chapter VII in [Pet75]).
Let ǫ′′ > 0. Let c1 be the constant in the above lemma, let γ = e
ǫ′′−1
eǫ′′+1
, and let σ2 = VarX∼Tℓ [X].
Let
B =
w ∈ R : |w| >
√√√√2 ln( γ√n′
c1
√
2π
)
− 4α
σ
√
n′
 .
Now, observe that
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈W
]
≤ Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈W ∩B
]
+ Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈ B
]
. (4)
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Lemma 28. For each w ∈W ∩B,
Pr[V (ti, tJ ′)/
√
n′ = w]
Pr[V (t′i, tJ ′)/
√
n′ = w]
≤ exp
(
ǫ′′ +O
(√
lnn′√
n′
))
.
Proof of lemma. Fix w ∈ W ∩ B. Let φ be the pdf of the standard normal distribution. By the
previous lemma, we have
Pr[V (ti, tJ ′)/
√
n′ = w]
Pr[V (t′i, tJ ′)/
√
n′ = w]
=
Pr[ 1√
n′
∑
j∈J ′ h(tj) = w − h(ti)/
√
n′]
Pr[ 1√
n′
∑
j∈J ′ h(tj) = w − h(t′i)/
√
n′]
≤
φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′) + c1√
n′
φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′)− c1√
n′
, (5)
where c1 ≥ 0 is some constant. Now, we note that
c1√
n′
≤ γ · φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′), (6)
since γ ·φ(w−h(ti)/
√
n′) = γ√
2π
exp
(
−12
(
w − h(ti)√
n′
)2) ≥ γ√
2π
exp
(
−12
(
|w| + |h(ti)|√
n′
)2)
, |h(ti)| ≤
4α
σ , and |w|+ 4ασ√n′ ≤
√
2 ln
(
γ
√
n′
c1
√
2π
)
(since w /∈ B). Similarly, we also have
c1√
n′
≤ γ · φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′). (7)
Now, combining (5) with (6) and (7), we have
Pr[V (ti, tJ ′)/
√
n′ = w]
Pr[V (t′i, tJ ′)/
√
n′ = w]
≤ φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′) + γ · φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′)
φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′)− γ · φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′)
=
1 + γ
1− γ ·
φ(w − h(ti)/
√
n′)
φ(w − h(t′i)/
√
n′)
= exp(ǫ′′) · exp
(
1
2
·
((
w − h(t
′
i)√
n′
)2
−
(
w − h(ti)√
n′
)2))
≤ exp(ǫ′′) · exp
(
1
2
·
∣∣∣∣h(ti)√n′ − h(t
′
i)√
n′
∣∣∣∣ · ∣∣∣∣2w − h(t′i)√n′ − h(ti)√n′
∣∣∣∣)
≤ exp(ǫ′′) · exp
1
2
· 8α
σ
√
n′
·
2
√√√√2 ln( γ√n′
c1
√
2π
)
≤ exp
(
ǫ′′ +O
(√
lnn′√
n′
))
,
where the second last inequality follows from the fact that the function h is bounded by 4ασ (in
absolute value) and |w|+ 4α
σ
√
n′
≤
√
2 ln
(
γ
√
n′
c1
√
2π
)
(since w /∈ B).
We will need to use the following lemma later:
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Lemma 29. Let Fn′ be the cdf of
V (tJ′)√
n′
= 1√
n′
∑
j∈J ′ h(tj) (where each tj ∼ T independently),
and let Φ be the cdf of the standard normal distribution. Then,
V (tJ′)√
n′
converges in distribution
uniformly to the standard normal random variable as follows:
sup
x∈R
|Fn′(x)− Φ(x)| = O
(
1√
n′
)
.
Proof of lemma. This lemma follows immediately from the Berry-Esseen theorem.
Lemma 30.
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈ B
]
≤ O
(
1
ǫ′′
√
n′
)
.
Proof of lemma. Let x =
√
2 ln
(
γ
√
n′
c1
√
2π
)
− 4α
σ
√
n′
, let Φ be the cdf of the standard normal distribution,
and let X ∼ N (0, 1). Observe that
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈ B
]
≤ Pr
[∣∣∣∣h(ti)√n′
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣V (tJ ′)√n′
∣∣∣∣ > x]
≤ 1− Pr
[∣∣∣∣V (tJ ′)√n′
∣∣∣∣ ≤ x− 4ασ√n′
]
≤ 1−
(
Pr
[
V (tJ ′)√
n′
≤ x− 4α
σ
√
n′
]
− Pr
[
V (tJ ′)√
n′
≤ −
(
x− 4α
σ
√
n′
)])
≤ 1−
(
Φ
(
x− 4α
σ
√
n′
)
− Φ
(
−
(
x− 4α
σ
√
n′
))
−O
(
1√
n′
))
= 1− Pr
[
|X| ≤ x− 4α
σ
√
n′
]
+O
(
1√
n′
)
= Pr
[
|X| > x− 4α
σ
√
n′
]
+O
(
1√
n′
)
,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that |h(ti)| ≤ 4ασ , and the fourth inequality follows
from the previous lemma. Now, by Mill’s inequality, we have Pr[|X| ≥ y] ≤
√
2
π · 1ye−y
2/2 for every
y > 0, so
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈ B
]
≤
√
2
π
· 1
x− 4α
σ
√
n′
exp
(
−1
2
(
x− 4α
σ
√
n′
)2)
+O
(
1√
n′
)
= O
(
1
γ
√
n′
)
= O
(
1
ǫ′′
√
n′
)
.
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Now, by Lemmas 28 and 30, we have from (4) that
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈W
]
≤ Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈W ∩B
]
+Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈ B
]
≤ exp
(
ǫ′′ +O
(√
lnn′√
n′
))
· Pr
[
V (t′i, tJ ′)√
n′
∈W ∩B
]
+O
(
1
ǫ′′
√
n′
)
≤ exp
(
ǫ′′ +O
(√
lnn√
n
))
· Pr
[
V (t′i, tJ ′)√
n
∈W
]
+O
(
1
ǫ′′
√
n
)
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that n′ = Θ(n). Now, set ǫ′′ = ǫ/m so that
Pr
[
V (ti, tJ ′)√
n′
∈W
]
≤ exp
(
ǫ
m
+O
(√
lnn√
n
))
· Pr
[
V (t′i, tJ ′)√
n
∈W
]
+O
(
m
ǫ
√
n
)
≤ exp
(
ǫ′
m
)
Pr
[
V (t′i, tJ ′)√
n′
∈W
]
+
δ
m
.
This proves (3), which concludes the proof of the theorem.
5 Obtaining Actual Truthfulness
In this section, we present a simple method of obtaining (actual) truthfulness from approximate
truthfulness. Approximate truthfulness, being an intermediate state between the complete lack of
truthfulness and actual truthfulness, is a natural candidate to be a “stepping stone” for obtaining
truthfulness. For example, in [NST12], Nissim et al. consider mechanisms with an additional
“reaction stage”, in which the social alternative has already been chosen and each player chooses
a reaction (for example, in a facility location problem a reaction would be going to a particular
facility). The mechanism can restrict the set of available reactions to a player based on his/her
reported type (for example, in a facility location problem a player can only go to the facility that
is closest to his/her reported type). Intuitively, if having a different type means that the player
will have a different optimal reaction to the chosen social alternative, then the mechanism designer
can make liars suffer by only allowing each player to choose the reaction that is optimal for his/her
reported type. This is the idea behind the “imposing mechanism” in [NST12]. The imposing
mechanism chooses a social alternative randomly, ignoring the agents’ reported types, and then
restricts the players’ reactions such that for every player, lying results in a loss of at least ǫ for
some ǫ > 0.
With the “imposing mechanism” as a tool, Nissim et al. proceed to show that an appropriate
randomization between the imposing mechanism and an approximately truthful mechanism that
has good efficiency results in a truthful mechanism that also has good efficiency. We can also use a
construction similar to the imposing mechanism to obtain persistent Bayes-Nash truthful mecha-
nisms from persistent ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful mechanisms. However, since the imposing mechanism
disregards the players’ reported types when choosing a social alternative, truthfulness comes at a
cost of decreased efficiency (this is also the case in [NST12]).
We propose a simple alternative technique to obtain truthfulness from ǫ-truthfulness, without
sacrificing any efficiency of the mechanism. In our model, the mechanism can verify the truthfulness
of a small number of players, and impose a fine on any player caught lying. We call this part of the
mechanism the deterrent payment scheme. Although the assumption that a reported type can be
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verified does not hold in settings such as political elections, where player preferences are subjective,
there are many other settings in which this assumption is appropriate.
One might ask, if the truth of the reported types can be verified, why doesn’t the mechanism
just find out all the true types, making the mechanism design problem trivial? The first reason is
that verification is often costly. For example, the government cannot afford to check every income
tax report, but audits are performed to deter individuals and organizations from cheating on their
taxes. Secondly, verifying the truth of an input is often easier than determining the true value. For
example, an organization may not be able to obtain an individual’s address from his or her name,
but it can send someone to visit a provided address to verify whether the individual actually lives
there. Similarly, verification emails are routinely used to check whether an individual actually has
access to the email address he or she provided.
We note that the deterrent payment scheme is much more meaningful and realistic when it
is used with an ǫ-truthful mechanism, than when it is used with general mechanisms. When a
mechanism is already ǫ-truthful, neither the number of verifications nor the fine needs to be large
in order to get actual truthfulness. Without ǫ-truthfulness, either the number of verifications may
need to be too large to be affordable, or the fine may need to be too large to be enforceable.
Finally, although we need to assume quasilinear utilities to use the deterrent payment scheme,
and the deterrent payment scheme involves a transfer of utilities (i.e. payments), only those who
lie will ever be required to pay. This means that in the truthful equilibrium, no payments are made
and the mechanism will not have excess money that it might need to ‘burn’. The fact that truthful
players never pay, and the fact that individual rationality in the truthful equilibrium is unaffected
by a deterrent payment scheme, means that a deterrent payment scheme may be useful in some
settings where the AGV mechanism by Arrow [Arr79] and dAspremont and Ge´rard-Varet [dGV79]
may be inappropriate.
5.1 Deterrent Payment Scheme
In this section, we assume that each player i has a quasilinear utility function u˜i : T × S ×R→ R
such that u˜i(t, s, p) = ui(t, s) − p, where ui is the utility function from Section 2. The notions
of truthfulness defined in Section 2.2 can be straight-forwardly adapted to the quasilinear utility
setting, and references to truthfulness in this section refer to these adapted notions.
Definition 31 (Deterrent Payment Scheme). A deterrent payment scheme with m verifications
is a function P : T n × ([n]× {0, 1})m → Rn.
Intuitively, the first input to the payment scheme is a vector of reported types; the second input
to the payment scheme is a set of m pairs, where a pair (i, 1) indicates that player i is lying, and
(i, 0) indicates that player i is not lying. In general, this input does not provide the true types of
the players, so even if the verification includes all players, the mechanism still will not know the
vector of true types.
We will show that the deterrent payment scheme can be added to a persistent approximately
Bayes-Nash truthful mechanism to make the resulting mechanism Bayes-Nash truthful. In particu-
lar, we will show that truthfulness is a weakly persistent Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Weakly persistent
Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a weakening of the persistent Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Instead of guar-
anteeing that no individual gains by being in a coalition, it guarantees that any coalition as a whole
cannot gain by deviating from the equilibrium. This means there are no side-payments that can be
made between members in a coalition such that each member gains by being in the coalition. We
make the notion precise in the following definition.
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Definition 32 (Weakly (k, r)-persistent Bayes-Nash truthful mechanism with a deter-
rent payment scheme). A mechanism M with deterrent payment scheme P with m verifications
is weakly (k, r)-persistent Bayes-Nash truthful if for every I ⊆ [n] with |I| ≤ k, every possible an-
nounced types t′I ∈ T |I| for I, every coalition C ⊆ [n] \ I with |C| ≤ r, every true types tC ∈ T |C|
for the coalition C, and every possible announced types t′C ∈ T |C| for the coalition C, we have∑
i∈C
EtJ ,X [ui(ti,M(tC , t
′
I , tJ))− Pi((tC , t′I , tJ),X)]
≥
∑
i∈C
EtJ ,X [ui(ti,M(t
′
C , t
′
I , tJ))− Pi((t′C , t′I , tJ),X)],
where J = [n]\(I∪C), tJ ∼ T |J |, and X is a random vector of m pairs from [n]×{0, 1}, obtained by
uniform-randomly selecting m players ℓ without replacement from [n] and including (ℓ, 0) if player
j was truthful (the announced type tˆℓ = tℓ), or including (ℓ, 1) if player ℓ was not truthful.
Note that in Definition 32, truthfulness is defined with respect to uniformly sampling and
verifying m of the players. This means that the deterrent payment scheme does not choose which
players will be verified.
We can define k-tolerant Bayes-Nash truthfulness for mechanisms with deterrent payment
schemes as weakly (k, 1)-persistent Bayes-Nash truthfulness. The term “weakly” no longer ap-
plies when we consider only k-tolerance, which does not involve coalitions.
Next, we observe that by pairing a ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful mechanism with a simple deterrent
payment scheme that imposes a fixed fine on any individual that is caught lying, we obtain a
persistent Bayes-Nash truthful mechanism.
Theorem 33. Let M be any (k, r)-persistent ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthful mechanism, and let P be a
deterrent payment scheme with m verifications defined by
Pi(t, V ) =
{
0 if (i, 1) /∈ V
d if (i, 1) ∈ V.
Then M with deterrent payment scheme P is
(1) weakly (k, r)-persistent Bayes-Nash truthful, if mn · d ≥ rǫ,
(2) k-tolerant Bayes-Nash truthful, if mn · d ≥ ǫ.
Proof. By definition of (k, r)-persistent ǫ-Bayes-Nash truthfulness of M , for every I ⊆ [n] with
|I| ≤ k, every possible announced types t′I ∈ T |I| for I, every coalition C ⊆ [n] \ I with |C| ≤ r,
every true types tC ∈ T |C| for the coalition C, every player i ∈ C in the coalition, and every possible
announced types t′C ∈ T |C| for the coalition C, we have
EtJ [ui(ti,M(tC , t
′
I , tJ))] ≥ EtJ [ui(ti,M(t′C , t′I , tJ))]− ǫ,
where J = [n] \ (I ∪ C) and tJ ∼ T |J |.
Note that the expected fine for any player ℓ in coalition C for deviating is
EtJ ,X [Pℓ((t
′
C , t
′
I , tJ),X)] =
{
0 if t′ℓ = tℓ
m
n · d if t′ℓ 6= tℓ.
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We will first show part (1). For any t′C 6= tC , at least one player ℓ in C must be lying, and thus
have an expected fine of mn · d.
Since mn · d ≥ |C|ǫ, we have∑
i∈C
EtJ ,X [ui(ti,M(tC , t
′
I , tJ))− Pi((tC , t′I , tJ),X)]
=
∑
i∈C
EtJ [ui(ti,M(tC , t
′
I , tJ))]
≥
∑
i∈C
(
EtJ [ui(ti,M(t
′
C , t
′
I , tJ))] − ǫ
)
≥
∑
i∈C
EtJ ,X [ui(ti,M(t
′
C , t
′
I , tJ))− Pi((tC , t′I , tJ),X)].
To see that (2) holds, note that by part (1), M with payment scheme P is weakly (k, 1)-persistent
Bayes-Nash truthful, and hence k-tolerant Bayes-Nash truthful, if mn · d ≥ ǫ.
We conclude this section with two examples that illustrate the use of a simple deterrent payment
scheme with the mechanisms from Section 4.
Example 34 (Facility Location). In Example 12, starting with a (k, r)-persistent ǫ-Bayes-Nash
truthful mechanism, the mechanism designer can discourage lying by randomly sampling m indi-
viduals, and imposing a fine on each individual caught lying about their residence. For instance, if
r = 10 and the fine is fixed at 10000 × ǫ, then the mechanism need only verify 0.1% of the players
to ensure truthfulness.
Example 35 (Golf Course vs. Low Cost Swimming Pool). In Example 19, to discourage
members from misreporting their income, the club will randomly select m of the members and ask
the member to provide his/her tax forms from the previous year. If the member is found to have
lied about his/her income, the club will impose a fine on the member.
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Appendix A Proofs of Basic Theorems about Privacy and Truth-
fulness
We first state a group version of Bayesian differential privacy that protects the privacy of groups
of at most c players.
Definition 36 ((c, k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian group differential privacy). A mechanism M : T n → S is
(c, k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian group differentially private if for every group of players C ⊆ [n] with |C| ≤ c,
every subset I ⊆ [n] \ C of players with |I| ≤ k, every pair of types tC , t′C ∈ T |C| for the players
in C, and every t′I ∈ T |I|, the following holds: Let J = [n] \ (I ∪ C) (the remaining players), and
tJ ∼ T |J |; then, for every Y ⊆ S, we have
Pr[M(tC , t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ · Pr[M(t′C , t′I , tJ) ∈ Y ] + δ,
where the probabilities are over tJ ∼ T |J |.
We now prove that Bayesian differential privacy implies group Bayesian differential privacy, but
the parameters degrade with increasing group size.
Theorem 37 (Bayesian differential privacy =⇒ Group Bayesian differential privacy).
Let M : T n → S be any mechanism that is (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially private. Then, for every
1 ≤ c ≤ k + 1, M is also (c, k − c+ 1, cǫ, ecǫ−1eǫ−1 δ)-Bayesian group differentially private.
Intuitively, if a mechanism is (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially private, then when a player i
changes his/her announced type to something non-truthful, the output distribution of the mecha-
nism changes very little, so player i’s utility also changes very little. This holds even if k players are
non-truthful, so the mechanism is k-tolerant approximate Bayes-Nash truthful. To obtain resilient
and persistent approximate Bayes-Nash truthfulness, we show that (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differential
privacy implies a group version of (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differential privacy that protects the privacy
of groups of players of a certain size (but the parameters ǫ and δ degrade with the group size).
Group privacy would then imply that even if a coalition of players change their announced types,
the output distribution of the mechanism changes very little, so the utility of each player in the
coalition changes very little. Thus, the mechanism is persistent approximate Bayes-Nash truthful.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ c ≤ k + 1, let C ⊆ [n] with |C| ≤ c, let I ⊆ [n] \ C with |I| ≤ k − c + 1, let
tC , t
′
C ∈ T |C|, let t′I ∈ T |I|, and let Y ⊆ S. Let J = [n] \ (I ∪ C) and tJ ∼ T |J |. We need to show
that
Pr[M(tC , t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ ecǫ Pr[M(t′C , t′I , tJ) ∈ Y ] +
ecǫ − 1
eǫ − 1 · δ. (1)
SinceM is (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially private, for every i ∈ [n], every I ′ ⊆ [n]\{i} with |I ′| ≤ k,
every ti, t
′
i ∈ T , and every t′I′ ∈ T |I
′|, we have
Pr[M(ti, t
′
I′ , tJ ′) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(t′i, t′I′ , tJ) ∈ Y ] + δ, (2)
where J ′ = [n] \ (I ′ ∪ {i}) and tJ ′ ∼ T |J ′|.
Suppose C = {i1, . . . , i|C|}, tC = (ti1 , . . . , ti|C|), and t′C = (t′i1 , . . . , t′i|C|). Let t
(0)
C = tC and
t
(|C|)
C = t
′
C , and more generally, for j = 0, . . . , |C|, let
t
(j)
C = (t
′
i1 , . . . , t
′
ij , tij+1 , . . . , ti|C|).
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Claim 38. For every j ∈ {0, . . . , |C| − 1},
Pr[M(t
(j)
C , t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(t(j+1)C , t′I , tJ) ∈ Y ] + δ. (3)
Proof of claim. Fix j ∈ {0, . . . , |C| − 1}. Let i = ij+1, I ′ = (C \ {i}) ∪ I, ti = tij+1 , t′i = t′ij+1 , and
t
′
I′ = ((t
(j)
C )−i, t
′
I). Let J
′ = [n] \ (I ′ ∪ {i}) and tJ ′ ∼ T |J ′|. Then, by (2), we have
Pr[M(ti, t
′
I′ , tJ ′) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(t′i, t′I′ , tJ ′) ∈ Y ] + δ,
which is equivalent to
Pr[M(t
(j)
C , t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(t(j+1)C , t′I , tJ) ∈ Y ] + δ,
as required.
Using the above claim repeatedly starting with j = 0, we get
Pr[M(t
(0)
C , t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ e|C|ǫPr[M(t(|C|)C , t′I , tJ) ∈ Y ] +
e|C|ǫ − 1
eǫ − 1 · δ,
which yields (1) since |C| ≤ c, as required.
We now prove Theorem 6, which we restate here for convenient reference.
Theorem 6 (Bayesian differential privacy =⇒ Persistent approximate truthfulness).
Suppose the utility functions are bounded by α > 0, i.e., the utility function for each player i is
ui : T × S → [−α,α]. Let M be any mechanism that is (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially private.
Then, M satisfies the following properties:
1. M is k-tolerant (ǫ+ 2δ)(2α)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
2. For every 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1, M is r-resilient (rǫ+ 2rδ)(2α)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
3. For every 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1, M is (k − r + 1, r)-persistent (rǫ+ 2rδ)(2α)-Bayes-Nash truthful.
Proof. Property 1 follows from Property 3 by setting r = 1 in Property 3. Property 2 follows
immediately from Property 3. Thus, it suffices to only show Property 3.
Let 1 ≤ r ≤ k + 1. We first note that if rǫ ≥ 1, then Property 3 immediately holds, since
the utility functions are bounded by α. Thus, we now assume that rǫ < 1. By Theorem 37,
since M is (k, ǫ, δ)-Bayesian differentially private, M is also (r, k− r+1, rǫ, erǫ−1eǫ−1 δ)-Bayesian group
differentially private. One can easily verify that erǫ − 1 ≤ 2rǫ for rǫ < 1, so erǫ−1eǫ−1 ≤ 2rǫǫ = 2r.
Thus, M is (r, k− r+1, rǫ, 2rδ)-Bayesian group differentially private. Then, for every C ⊆ [n] with
|C| ≤ r, every I ⊆ [n] \ C with |I| ≤ k − r + 1, every tC , t′C ∈ T |C|, every t′I ∈ T |I|, and every
Y ⊆ S, we have
Pr[M(tC , t
′
I , tJ) ∈ Y ] ≤ erǫ Pr[M(t′C , t′I , tJ) ∈ Y ] + 2rδ, (1)
where J = [n] \ (I ∪ C) and tJ ∼ T |J |.
Let I ⊆ [n] with |I| ≤ k − r + 1, let t′I ∈ T |I|, let C ⊆ [n] \ I with |C| ≤ r, let tC ∈ T |C|, let
i ∈ C, and let t′C ∈ T |C|. Let J = [n] \ (I ∪ C) and tJ ∼ T |J |. We need to show that
EtJ [ui(ti,M(t
′
C , t
′
I , tJ))] ≤ EtJ [ui(ti,M(tC , t′I , tJ))] + (rǫ+ 2rδ)(2α). (2)
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Following [DRV10], given two discrete random variables X and Y , let
Dδ
′
∞(X||Y ) := max
W⊆Supp(X) s.t. Pr[X∈W ]>δ′
ln
(
Pr[X ∈W ]− δ′
Pr[Y ∈W ]
)
and
∆(X,Y ) := max
W⊆Supp(X)∪Supp(Y )
|Pr[X ∈W ]− Pr[Y ∈W ]|
=
1
2
∑
w∈Supp(X)∪Supp(Y )
|Pr[X = w]− Pr[Y = w]|.
The first distance measure is known as δ′-approximate max-divergence (e.g., see [DRV10]) and the
second distance measure is known as statistical distance (also known as statistical difference or
total variation distance). It is known that if Dδ
′
∞(X||Y ) ≤ ǫ′ and Dδ′∞(Y ||X) ≤ ǫ′, then there exists
a random variable Z with support Supp(X)∪Supp(Y ) such that ∆(X,Z) ≤ δ′, and D0∞(Z||Y ) ≤ ǫ′
and D0∞(Y ||Z) ≤ ǫ′ (see [DRV10]).
Let X = M(tC , t
′
I , tJ) and X
′ = M(t′C , t
′
I , tJ). Then, by (1) and the symmetry of tC and t
′
C ,
we have D2rδ∞ (X||X ′) ≤ rǫ and D2rδ∞ (X ′||X) ≤ rǫ. Then, there exists a random variable Z such
that ∆(X ′, Z) ≤ 2rδ and D0∞(Z||X) ≤ rǫ. From D0∞(Z||X) ≤ rǫ, we have that for every s ∈ S,
Pr[Z = s] ≤ erǫ Pr[X = s]. (3)
Claim 39. E[ui(ti,X
′)] ≤ E[ui(ti, Z)] + 4rδα
Proof of claim. Observe that
|E[ui(ti,X ′)]− E[ui(ti, Z)]| = |
∑
s∈S
Pr[X ′ = s] · ui(ti, s)−
∑
s∈S
Pr[Z = s] · ui(ti, s)]|
≤
∑
s∈S
|Pr[X ′ = s]− Pr[Z = s]| · |ui(ti, s)|
≤ (2∆(X ′, Z)) · α
≤ 4rδα.
Claim 40. E[ui(ti, Z)] ≤ erǫ · E[ui(ti,X)]
Proof of claim. Observe that
E[ui(ti, Z)] =
∑
s∈S
Pr[Z = s] · ui(ti, s) ≤
∑
s∈S
erǫ Pr[X = s] · ui(ti, s) = erǫ · E[ui(ti,X)],
where the inequality follows from (3).
Now, using the above two claims, we have
E[ui(ti,M(t
′
C , t
′
I , tJ))] = E[ui(ti,X
′)]
≤ E[ui(ti, Z)] + 4rδα
≤ erǫ · E[ui(ti,X)] + 4rδα
= erǫ · E[ui(ti,M(tC , t′I , tJ))] + 4rδα
= E[ui(ti,M(tC , t
′
I , tJ))] + (e
rǫ − 1) · E[ui(ti,M(tC , t′I , tJ))] + 4rδα
≤ E[ui(ti,M(tC , t′I , tJ))] + 2rǫα+ 4rδα
= E[ui(ti,M(tC , t
′
I , tJ))] + (rǫ+ 2rδ)(2α).
33
where the last inequality follows from the fact that erǫ − 1 ≤ 2rǫ for rǫ < 1. This completes the
proof.
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